University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Educational Psychology Papers and Publications

Educational Psychology, Department of

2010

A Conceptual Guide to Natural History Museum
Visitors’ Understanding of Evolution
E. Margaret Evans
University of Michigan, evansem@umich.edu

Amy N. Spiegel
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, aspiegel1@unl.edu

Wendy Gram
University of Oklahoma

Brandy N. Frazier
University of Hawaii at Manoa

Medha Tare
University of Virginia
See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/edpsychpapers
Part of the Child Psychology Commons, Cognitive Psychology Commons, Developmental
Psychology Commons, and the School Psychology Commons
Evans, E. Margaret; Spiegel, Amy N.; Gram, Wendy; Frazier, Brandy N.; Tare, Medha; Thompson, Sarah; and Diamond, Judy, "A
Conceptual Guide to Natural History Museum Visitors’ Understanding of Evolution" (2010). Educational Psychology Papers and
Publications. 196.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/edpsychpapers/196

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Educational Psychology, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Educational Psychology Papers and Publications by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Authors

E. Margaret Evans, Amy N. Spiegel, Wendy Gram, Brandy N. Frazier, Medha Tare, Sarah Thompson, and Judy
Diamond

This article is available at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/edpsychpapers/196

Published in Journal of Research in Science Teaching 47:3 (2010), pp. 326–353; doi: 10.1002/tea.20337
Copyright © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Used by permission.
Submitted August 2, 2007; accepted July 27, 2009; published online November 18, 2009.

A Conceptual Guide to
Natural History Museum Visitors’
Understanding of Evolution
E. Margaret Evans,1 Amy N. Spiegel,2 Wendy Gram,3 Brandy N. Frazier,4
Medha Tare,5 Sarah Thompson,6 and Judy Diamond7
1. Center for Human Growth and Development, University of Michigan, 300 N. Ingalls Building,
10th Floor, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-5406 USA
2. Department of Educational Psychology, Center for Instructional Innovation, University of
Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0384 USA
3. Sam Noble Oklahoma Museum of Natural History, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma
73072-7029 USA
4. Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2430 Campus Road, Gartley Hall 110,
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822-2294 USA
5. Department of Psychology, University of Virginia, P.O. Box 400400, Charlottesville, Virginia
22904 USA
6. University of Michigan Exhibit Museum of Natural History, 1109 Geddes Ave, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1079 USA
7. University of Nebraska State Museum of Natural History, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0374 USA
Corresponding author – E. Margaret Evans, email evansem@umich.edu
Wendy Gram’s present address is National Ecological Observatory Network (NEON), Inc., 5340 Airport Blvd.,
Boulder, CO 80301.

Abstract
Museum visitors are an ideal population for assessing the persistence of the conceptual barriers that
make it difficult to grasp Darwinian evolutionary theory. In comparison with other members of the
public, they are more likely to be interested in natural history, have higher education levels, and be
exposed to the relevant content. If museum visitors do not grasp evolutionary principles, it seems
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unlikely that other members of the general public would do so. In the current study, 32 systematically selected visitors to three Midwest museums of natural history provided detailed open-ended
explanations of biological change in seven diverse organisms. They were not told that these were
evolutionary problems. Responses were coded as: informed naturalistic reasoning, featuring some
understanding of key evolutionary concepts, novice naturalistic reasoning, featuring intuitive explanations that are also present in childhood, and creationist reasoning, featuring supernatural explanations. All visitors were mixed reasoners, using one or more of these patterns in different
permutations across the seven organisms: 72% used a combination of informed naturalistic reasoning and novice naturalistic reasoning, while a further 28% added creationist reasoning to this mix.
Correlational analyses indicated that for many visitors these reasoning patterns were coherent rather
than fragmented. The theoretical model presented in this article contributes to an analysis of the
developmental and cultural factors associated with these patterns. This could help educators working in diverse educational settings understand how to move visitors and students toward more informed reasoning patterns.
Keywords: evolution, museums, conceptual change, intuitive beliefs, creationist beliefs, cognitive
development, culture

An understanding of evolution and of the importance of evolution research is central to
scientific literacy today. Without this foundation, members of the public are unlikely to
grasp many of the health and environmental issues of our time (e.g., Nesse &Williams,
1996). Furthermore, modern theories of evolution provide the basic principles for understanding a broad array of topics from biology to medicine, psychology, and climate
change. Yet, surveys and more focused studies indicate that about 50% of Americans are
unlikely to accept, let alone understand, the evolutionary principles of descent with modification and natural selection, as evidenced by their belief that humans originated through
supernatural agency (Almquist & Cronin, 1988; Gallup, 2007; Numbers, 1992, 2003).
Among industrialized nations, the U.S. ranks second to last in acceptance of evolution
(Miller, Scott, & Okomoto, 2006).
Even among those who endorse evolution, misunderstandings occur (e.g., Sinatra,
Southerland, McConaughy, & Demastes, 2003; Smith & Siegel, 2004); numerous studies
demonstrate that students who apparently accept the idea of evolutionary origins routinely misunderstand natural selection, construing evolutionary change in pre-Darwinian
terms, instead (e.g., Evans, 2000, 2001; Banet & Ayuso, 2003; Bishop & Anderson, 1990;
Brumby, 1984; Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985a,b; Dagher & BouJaoude, 1997; Good,
1992; Lawson & Worsnop, 1992; Nehm & Reilly, 2007; Shtulman, 2006). Such findings suggest a substantive failure on the part of public education to provide an adequate foundation for comprehending evolutionary theory. Some of this failure can be traced to widely
publicized anti-evolution movements (e.g., Scott & Matzke, 2007), whose persistent efforts
have resulted in state standards that de-emphasize the role of evolution in science (Beardsley, 2004; Lerner, 2000) and teachers who feel anxious about including evolution in the
curriculum (Griffith & Brem, 2004).
Although much of the difficulty accepting evolution is frequently related to deeply held
religious beliefs (Mazur, 2005; Numbers 1992), we take a somewhat different approach in
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this article. We argue that such widespread problems in both acceptance and understanding stem not only from these cultural influences but also from the intuitive reasoning processes that constrain children’s grasp of biological phenomena (Bloom & Weisberg, 2007;
Evans, 2000, 2001). Thus, a central purpose of this study is to investigate whether intuitive
beliefs that appear early in childhood persist in adult populations, impeding adults’ grasp
of evolution (Evans, 2001, 2008). More specifically, we examine (1) patterns of explanation:
in particular, the extent to which adults use intuitive reasoning alone or with evolutionary
or creationist reasoning and (2) the coherence of such reasoning patterns. A clearer understanding of the nature of these intuitive reasoning processes and the role they play in adult
reasoning should provide a better foundation for more effective interventions in diverse
educational settings. The studies reported in this article build on the considerable body of
research, cited earlier, demonstrating that students of all ages misconstrue evolution. It
extends this research by providing and testing a developmental and cultural framework
for understanding the origin and persistence of these ideas.
Our focus here is on museum visitors because they provide an ideal population for assessing the persistence of intuitive reasoning patterns that limit an understanding of Darwinian evolution. According to the National Science Board (2008), 60% of adults have
visited an informal science setting, such as a natural history or science museum, in the
previous year. Museum visitors are more highly educated than the population at large
(Korn, 1995) and are less likely to endorse creationist ideas (Spiegel, Evans, Gram, & Diamond, 2006). Most importantly, they are interested enough in natural history to voluntarily
visit such museums; thus, any misunderstandings on their part are not likely to be attributed to a mere lack of exposure to the relevant content. As research institutions, natural
history museums house the evidence that helps scientists describe the world’s biodiversity
and understand the evolution of life. Sharing that perspective with a public audience is the
mission of most natural history museums and drives their exhibits on evolution (Diamond
& Scotchmoor, 2006). If museum visitors do not grasp evolutionary principles, it seems
unlikely that other members of the general public would do so.
The only systematic study of visitors’ understanding of evolution (Macfadden et al.,
2007) to date, indicates that U.S. museum visitors do have difficulties, but that study focused on a single problem, microevolutionary change in cheetahs (Bishop & Anderson,
1990), with a limited analysis of visitors’ concepts. In the current study, we profile visitors’
reasoning about the evolution of seven organisms that were to be featured in Explore Evolution, an NSF-funded exhibition developed to make evolution accessible to young people
and the public (Diamond & Evans, 2007; Diamond, Spiegel, Meier, & Disbrow, 2004). The
focus of the exhibition was seven contemporary research projects that have made major
contributions to a scientific understanding of evolution. These included studies of HIV
evolution, the emergence of a new diatom species, fungus-growing ants and their coevolving partners, sexual selection among Hawaiian flies, variation in the Galapagos finches,
the genetic ties between humans and chimps, and fossilized walking whales. These research projects were selected because they illustrate a common set of evolutionary principles in organisms ranging from the microscopic to the largest of all mammals. In addition,
these projects include examples of small-scale and large-scale evolutionary change, representing both micro- and macro-evolutionary processes.
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In the current study, we assessed the utility of a particular theoretical framework for
understanding museum visitors’ reasoning about the evolution of this broad range of organisms. We first provide an overview and later use it to articulate a focused set of research
questions.
Theoretical Framework: An Overview
Central to the current framework are three major sources of ideas about biological change
(see fig. 1; Evans, 2005). Intuitive or commonsense reasoning comprises the everyday explanations that most easily come to mind when humans solve problems (see Evans, 2008).
Countering these intuitive biases, the scientific and religious communities provide the two
primary cultural sources of information about evolution, communicated through schools,
museums, churches, and the media. In the case of religion, the most influential U.S. source
is Biblical literalism whose adherents believe that God created each species individually a
few thousand years ago (Numbers, 1992). According to a 2007 Gallup Poll, about 46% of
the U.S. public agree that God created humans in this way. This same poll indicated that
another 36% accept some variation of theistic evolution, believing that biological evolution
occurred over millions of years, with God guiding the process. Only 13% agree that God
played no role in biological evolution. This pattern of agreement is virtually unchanged
over the past 20 years.

Figure 1. Reasoning about evolution—three major influences: intuitive reasoning, the
scientific community, and the religious community.

The commonsense or everyday reasoning of the visitor, however, remains as the more
pervasive source of influence. From studies in cognitive science and cognitive anthropol-
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ogy, several intuitive reasoning modes (see fig. 1) have been identified that are hypothesized to underlie human reasoning about the biological world, including an everyday or
intuitive biology and an intuitive psychology (e.g., Atran, 1990; Carey, 1985; Gelman, 2003;
Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Keil, 1994; Medin & Atran, 2004; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). These
reasoning modes appear early in childhood and are associated with distinct cognitive biases that appear to make evolutionary ideas counterintuitive (Evans, 2000, 2001, 2008). The
relevant biases are that living things are separate, stable, and unchanging, with an underlying causal nature or essence (essentialism) and that animate behavior is goal directed (teleology) and intentional (theory of mind). From an evolutionary perspective, the biological
world is neither stable nor purposeful.
In the current study, we define novice naturalistic reasoning as the use of intuitive modes
of reasoning. The communities of science and religion build on this intuitive base, resulting
in informed naturalistic reasoning or creationist reasoning, respectively (see fig. 1; Evans, 2005).
We apply the term informed naturalistic reasoning to reasoning patterns that are intermediate between those found in novices and in scientific experts. Visitors’ spontaneous evocation of one or more of the VIST (variation, inheritance, selection, and time) evolutionary
concepts is central to the informed reasoning pattern. The acronym VIST from the University of California Museum of Paleontology website (http://evolution.berkeley.edu) provided cognitive organizers for framing and remembering core evolutionary concepts in
the exhibition. While novice naturalistic reasoners’ intuitive explanations are incorrect from
a scientific standpoint, they are the precursors of the methodological naturalism of science.
Both novice and informed naturalistic reasoners evoke natural causes (naturalism) and
thus differ from creationist reasoners who evoke supernatural causes. This crucial distinction between natural and supernatural causation was invoked by Judge John Jones III in
the Dover Trial, to explain his rejection of claims that ID (intelligent design) theory is scientific (Mervis, 2006).
Intuitive or Alternative Conceptions?
Although their origins differ, the proposed theoretical framework maps on to a venerable
tradition in science education research of alternative conceptions that pose barriers to science
understanding (for a summary, see Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1994). While the alternative conception framework is rooted in Piagetian traditions, the current framework has
its roots in contemporary post-Piagetian theories of domain-specific conceptual change
(e.g., Carey, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1998) as well as anthropological studies of folk biologies (e.g., Atran, 1990; Medin & Atran, 2004). Thus, the term “intuitive theories,” used
throughout this article, references framework theories, the building blocks of children’s
and adults’ everyday understanding of the world. Because they play a foundational role
in conceptual development, in general we prefer to use the phrase intuitive conceptions
rather than alternative conceptions. The latter will be used judiciously to refer to scientifically incorrect ideas that are meaningful in everyday reasoning (Wandersee et al., 1994).
What Is Novice Naturalistic Reasoning?
One of the main issues addressed in this study is whether visitors’ novice naturalistic reasoning is based, in part, on themes apparent in children’s intuitive theories of the biological
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and psychological worlds. These themes appear in the alternative conceptions research on
students’ understanding of evolution mentioned earlier. Although disagreements remain,
the current consensus is that young elementary school children reason biologically rather
than exclusively psychologically, albeit using a somewhat different framework than that
used by adults (Carey, 1985; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). One lingering question is the extent
to which children construe goal-directed action as intentional. Kelemen (1999, 2004) claims,
for example, the young children are promiscuously teleological, ascribing purpose or function to natural phenomena, a capacity that is tied to their intuitive psychology.
We agree that some form of teleological reasoning is foundational, and that it is often
associated with intentional reasoning. However, based on research with infants (e.g.,
Gergely & Csibra, 2003; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005; Woodward,
2009), we argue that this is not necessarily the case. Further, we argue that in order to understand the nature of the precursors to evolutionary thinking, it is advantageous to parse
these conceptual systems. School-aged children distinguish between functional explanations that satisfy physiological needs, and mental state explanations that satisfy desires,
even if they often default to the latter. Six- to seven-year-olds, for example, reason that
animals and humans breathe because they need to, not because they want to (Poling & Evans, 2002). In this analysis, the concept of goal-directedness undergirds both an intuitive
psychology and an intuitive biology. It is the reason behind the action that distinguishes
the two conceptual systems. Accordingly, we assess whether, when explaining biological
change, visitors utilize goal-directed explanations that reference the basic survival needs
of the organism or/and intentional explanations that reference mental states.
Pure or Mixed Reasoning Patterns?
An intriguing issue concerns the adoption of what would appear to be contradictory
frameworks, with about a third of the U.S. public espousing both evolutionist and creationist ideas (Evans, 2000, 2001; Gallup, 2007). Many leaders in the theological and scientific communities reject one stance and adopt the other, yet there is a lively debate as to the
ways in which individuals can combine these stances (e.g., Evans, 2008; Scott, 2004). One
resolution is theistic evolution, which can be construed as a causal chain with God as first
cause, initiating the process of evolution. In the lay public’s reasoning, however, mixed
models are more typical (Poling & Evans, 2004a). Typically, creationist explanations are
more likely to be applied to humans than to other species (Evans, 2000, 2001; Sinatra et al.,
2003), with (pre-Darwinian) need-based evolutionary explanations more likely to be applied to species that are taxonomically distant from humans (Evans, 2008). In synthetic
blends (Evans, Legare, & Rosengren, in press; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992), culturally available scientific or theological stances are fused with intuitive or novice explanations (the
overlapping circles in fig. 1).
Thus, a key research question is to what extent do natural history museum visitors
adopt pure or mixed models to describe evolutionary change. Further, if mixed models are
prevalent, a related question concerns their coherence. One of the premises of the framework theory approach is that coherence is necessary; without this core characteristic such
theories could not provide the foundation for children’s everyday explanations (e.g.,
Carey, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Yet, there is an intense debate regarding the nature
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of novices’ reasoning. Vosniadou and her colleagues argue that one of the main barriers to
conceptual change in science education is the coherence of the underlying naive intuitive
frameworks, which arise from ontological commitments that differ radically from those of
scientific theories (Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008). An alternative position is
that the novice’s knowledge base in any domain consists of discrete unconnected elements
and that coherence is achieved only as a function of science instruction (diSessa, 2008). In
this study, we shall assess whether specific concepts or themes within visitors’ reasoning
patterns are correlated: If they are, then this would lend support to the coherence hypothesis; alternatively, the fragmentation argument (diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004) would
be supported if targeted themes are uncorrelated. One prediction, stemming from the
above analyses of children’s explanations, was that need-based reasoning would present a
unique pattern of significant intercorrelations in adults.
Study Overview: Parts I and II
Visitors were recruited from three Midwest natural history museums where the Explore
Evolution exhibition was to be installed. Importantly, because this study was carried out
prior to the advance publicity or installation, study participants had no exposure to the
exhibition content, nor were they told that it was about evolution. Thus, this study is
unique in examining whether visitors would spontaneously apply evolutionary concepts,
even when they were not cued to do so. Visitors were asked to explain seven problems (see
table 1), each of which focused on one of the organisms central to the work of each of the
scientists featured in the exhibition. Although each problem appeared to be different, they
could all be answered using the same evolutionary principles. (In pilot work, an expert
remarked that he would respond similarly to each question.)
Table 1. The seven evolutionary problems presented to museum visitors
VIRUS: I’m going to tell you about a person who has the virus called HIV. You may know that this virus
causes the disease called AIDS. Here is a picture of the HIV virus greatly enlarged (give illustration to subject).
This virus is in a child called George. Now scientists can read the genetic material of a virus to tell what kind
it is. When the scientists first looked at George’s virus, he had three varieties of HIV, each slightly different.
Later, when the scientists went back to check on George’s viruses again, there were now 5 types of HIV. Describe how you think George came to have the new kinds of HIV viruses.
DIATOM: Yellowstone Lake is in the middle of Yellowstone National Park (show map). There are many types
of algae in this lake. However, scientists have found a kind of algae in this lake that is not found anywhere
else (show diatom photo). These algae first appeared about 14,000 years ago. At that time, the climate was warming. Describe how you think this new kind of algae came to be in Yellowstone Lake.
ANT/FUNGUS: Scientists have learned about a kind of ant that looks after a special type of fungus in “ant
farms” (show picture). The ants eat the fungus and this type of ant and the fungus have had this relationship
for millions of years. However, there is another type of fungus that attacks the farms. But, the ant carries
around bacteria that protect the farms from the attacking fungus. These four organisms have been living together for many millions of years. Describe how you think this partnership came about.
FRUIT FLIES: There were once no fruit flies on Hawaii (show map). Then, about 8 million years ago, a few fruit
flies landed on one of the islands. Now there are 800 different kinds of fruit flies in Hawaii (show photos of flies).
How would you explain this?
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FINCHES: The Galapagos Islands are located off the coast of South America (show map of chain). On one of
these islands, scientists have been studying one kind of finch. Here is a picture of this finch (photo has more
than one ground finch). The scientists measure the size of the finch’s beak (show picture). On their first trip to the
island, the scientists found that most of the beaks of this finch were on the small side. Then a severe drought
occurred on the island, and it wiped out most of the plants that make the small seeds that the finches feed on.
The only seeds that were common were really tough seeds that require a large beak to open. Then the scientists
came back a few years later and measured the beaks again. This time, they found that most of the beaks were
on the large side. How would you explain that on their return trip to the island, larger beaks were found on
more of the finches?
HUMAN/CHIMP: Here is a picture of a human being and a picture of a chimpanzee (show photographs). Scientists think that humans and chimps shared a common ancestor as recently as 5 million years ago. Describe
how you think that both a chimp and a human could arise from the same kind of ancestor.
WHALE/HIPPO: Here is a picture of a new kind of whale that was found in the desert in the Middle East
(show cover of Science). Scientists believe that this whale shares a common ancestor with hippos (show photo of
hippo). Describe how you think that both a whale and a hippo could arise from the same kind of ancestor.

In line with the above theoretical perspective, visitors’ explanations were coded into
three reasoning patterns: novice naturalistic, informed naturalistic, and creationist. Visitors could evoke a particular theme from any one of these patterns up to seven times (once
for each of the seven organisms), giving us sufficient data to assess the intercorrelations
between particular themes. Such a coding system required both top-down and bottom-up
coding methods. The former corresponds to the nomothetic approach (Wandersee et al.,
1994), in which visitors’ explanations were compared with the scientific model, and the
latter to idiographic approaches in which meaningful themes emerged during the coding
process; coding was still constrained, however, by the conceptual framework. Data analyses are reported in two parts, with Part I focused on the nature of visitors’ reasoning patterns, to what extent they are pure or mixed, and Part II, on their coherence. The latter was
addressed by examining correlations between targeted themes from the reasoning patterns. This two-part examination of the data allowed us to obtain detailed knowledge of
visitors’ reasoning patterns, using a qualitative analysis, and to derive inferences regarding their coherence, using a quantitative analysis (Miles & Huberman 1994).
Research Predictions
Based on prior research and our theoretical model, described earlier, one key research prediction was that few museum visitors would endorse any one reasoning pattern exclusively across all seven organisms; in fact, mixed patterns seemed likely to prevail (see the
overlapping circles in fig. 1). Further, based on developmental research and theory, we
also predicted that even if visitors endorsed mixed models, the pattern of intercorrelations
between themes would be demonstrably coherent.
For Part I analyses, specific research questions derived from the overall prediction that
mixed reasoning patterns would predominate, were: (1) When reasoning about evolutionary problems, would museum visitors spontaneously evoke evolutionary concepts across
all organisms? (2) To what extent would visitors use creationist and novice reasoning, as
well? (3) Would the intuitive ideas evident in previous research on children’s and students’
reasoning about evolutionary problems be evident in museum visitors’ novice naturalistic
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reasoning? Based on findings from earlier research (see Evans, 2008 for a summary), we
predicted that themes from the novice reasoning pattern were more likely to be elicited by
microscopic or invertebrate organisms and that to the extent that creationism would be
apparent in this sample of museum visitors, the human seemed the most likely to elicit this
reasoning pattern (Spiegel et al., 2006). Part II analyses address the coherence of the relationships between themes from the reasoning patterns. Specific hypotheses regarding the
intercorrelated themes are presented in Part II.
Method: Parts I and II
Participants
Thirty-two systematically selected museum visitors (38% male, 62% female; 97% non-Hispanic white, 3%multiracial) from three Midwest universities’ natural history museums
were asked to take part in a 25- to 30-minute audiotaped interview with trained interviewers.
Demographics
At the conclusion of the interview, each visitor completed a demographic form. All the
results were compiled and averaged across the three sites. Visitors’ age groups were: 18–
24 years (10%), 25–65 years (84%), and 65+ years (6%). Educational levels completed by the
visitors consisted of: High School (19%); 2-Year College or Vocational School (22%); 4-Year
College (38%); Graduate School (22%). Overall, the visitors’ education levels were similar
to those found at other natural history museums and science centers with about 60% having completed a 4-year college or higher levels of education (Korn, 1995). Only one participant, who taught earth science, had a biology-related profession; the other occupations
were science or engineering (n = 4), other professional (n = 13), artistic (n = 3), homemakers
(n = 4), service and retail (n = 5), and retired (n = 2). Fifty-eight percent had a religious
affiliation (42% did not). The average number of museum visits per year was 5.2 (SD 5.9;
Range: 0–25).
Procedure and Protocol
As visitors entered the museum, every other museum visitor was approached (for groups,
one adult was selected) and given a brief overview of the purpose of the research, and then
asked to participate in the study (participation rate was 55%). Visitors were told that their
feedback would be used to provide information about a new exhibition and that they
would be asked to explain “some new scientific discoveries about a variety of living
things.” They were not told that these were evolutionary problems, nor was the term evolution used. After visitors agreed to take part they were informed of their rights as study
participants (as specified by IRB approvals from all three institutions) and specifically
asked for permission to record the interviews, which were anonymous. At the conclusion
they were presented with a token gift for their participation.
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Interview Protocol
First, visitors were told, “I would like to ask you a few questions about current research on
how living things have changed over time. I want to know what you think about some
new scientific discoveries about a variety of living things.” Each visitor was then asked to
explain the seven evolutionary problems. These problems were based on the core questions addressed in each of the exhibits. Although each problem could be solved by applying the same evolutionary principles, each question was worded differently because the
kind of biological change portrayed differed by organism. None of them mentioned the
word evolution. The seven questions, accompanied by relevant photographs, were presented to the museum visitor in the following fixed order: Flies, Finches, Diatom, HIV Virus, Ant/Fungus, Whale/Hippo, Human/Chimp. For conceptual ease, however, in this
article the questions and data will be presented in order of size, from the smallest to the
largest organism (see table 1). From a religious viewpoint, the human/chimp comparison
was perceived to be the most problematic, so it was presented last to avoid influencing
visitors’ responses to other questions. If interviewees gave an extremely brief response, or
said they didn’t know, they were asked: “Can you tell me more” or “Can you take a guess
at what you think might have happened.”
In a pilot study, we found that a majority of a representative sample of 60 natural history
museum visitors interpreted the VIST terms as biological concepts (e.g., defining inheritance as the transmission of genes rather than artifacts). This finding indicated that our
expectation that visitors in the current study might use the VIST framework was realistic.
In addition, we assessed visitors’ familiarity with and interest in the organisms to be featured in the current study, which provided background information that was used to interpret the results of the study.
Visitors’ responses were transcribed and coded into the three main reasoning patterns.
The overall coding system development is described first, followed by a description of the
coding systems for each of the reasoning patterns, in turn. For each reasoning pattern, we
provide a more detailed theoretical rationale before describing the themes.
Coding System
Coding System Development
The development of the coding scheme was carried out by a team made up of science educators and cognitive developmentalists; three with biology backgrounds, and three with
extensive experience in content analyses of explanations. The team conducted a content
analysis of the transcriptions of visitors’ responses and identified those units of analysis
(utterances) that expressed concepts related to the question. These conceptual units ranged
in size from single words (e.g., the term “evolution”) to several speech fragments that expressed a particular concept. Based on our theoretical framework, an a priori codebook
was created and used to carry out a preliminary mapping of the conceptual units onto
distinct themes (codes), which, in turn, mapped onto the three main reasoning patterns.
Conceptual units that did not map onto any of the themes were initially coded as other.
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Further content analyses of the other category revealed additional themes and the codebook was updated to include these emergent themes. All the themes were operationally
defined (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
In the final round of coding, two trained coders coded each response. To ensure that
they were not influenced by a visitor’s overall responses, coders coded all visitors’ responses to one question but did not view the entire transcript of any one visitor. Initial
interrater reliability ranged from 86% to 100% for any one question. Subsequently, all responses were coded to 100% agreement with the entire team’s agreement. The codebook
was divided into three sections: Informed naturalistic reasoning (table 2), novice naturalistic reasoning (table 3), and creationist reasoning (table 4). Operational definitions of each
theme, along with brief examples, are given in these tables and in the text, and the prevalence of each theme along with detailed examples of visitors’ explanations are given in the
Results section.
Informed Naturalistic Reasoning (INR)
Conceptual Framework
One crucial issue was whether visitors would spontaneously realize that these were evolutionary problems. Their mention of an evolutionary term was one sign of this realization
and this was coded as an informed naturalistic reasoning theme (see table 2). Ideally, evolutionary reasoners should be able to reason about the biological mechanism underlying a
biological phenomenon How does it work? and link it to the more distal or evolutionary
cause: Why does it work that way? (Mayr, 1982, pp. 67–68). Citing only a proximate biological
mechanism does not address the evolutionary cause. Given previous research, it seemed
unlikely that even the more expert visitors would access a fully developed evolutionary
framework. On the other hand, an informed naturalistic reasoner might well exhibit some
understanding of the VIST concepts and the related concept of common descent. Common
descent was coded separately from selection and time because earlier research indicated
that while children and adults (or pre-Darwinian evolutionists) might accept the idea of
descent with modification, this does not mean that they understand the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection (Evans, 2001, 2008). The nomothetic approach prevailed in the
coding of the informed reasoning pattern, with textbooks on evolution (e.g., Futuyma,
1998) providing the scientific model. Some modification of the major themes occurred during coding development.
Table 2. Informed naturalistic reasoning pattern: themes, definitions, and examples
Theme

Operational Definition

Examples

Evolution term

Mention of main evolution term

“Evolution,” “Darwin(ian),”
“Survival of the fittest”

Variation

Differences among individuals in
a population

“There were finches with larger
beaks and some with smaller
beaks”

Inheritance

Traits (genes) are inherited and
passed on to the next generation

“The big-beaked finches had babies that looked the same”
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Common descent

Reference to a common ancestor
or a descendent (implication that
these were different “species”)

“They could have been derived
from the same early ancestor”

(Natural) Selection

Organisms with adaptive traits
are more likely to survive

“The large-beaked finches were
better able to eat the large seeds
and they survived”

Time

Implication that there had to be
enough time for natural selection
to occur

“I supposed they just changed
over time”

Chance

Any reference to happenstance,
chance, or accident

“. . . then this relationship accidentally happened”

Sexual selection

Any reference to sexual selection

No examples

Ecological pressure

Mention of ecological pressures
as a causal agent in diversification
or change

“. . . adapt to the different ecological niches on the islands”

Codebook
Responses coded under the informed naturalistic reasoning pattern expressed a rudimentary understanding of evolution by invoking a Darwinian evolutionary term, one of the
evolutionary subconcepts—variation, inheritance, selection, time—from the VIST framework
or a related concept (see table 2). The VIST definitions that informed our coding were as
follows: Variation referred to differences among individuals in a population, such as differences in traits (features, behaviors), a mutation, or genes. Inheritance referred to traits
that are passed from one generation to the next. Selection referred to the idea that organisms
with traits that are adaptive (in one environment) are more likely to survive (and pass these
factors on to the next generation). Time referred to the idea that the number of generations
produced over a given time period determines whether evolution change will occur rapidly (HIV) or slowly (whales).
To distinguish those responses that included evolutionary terms (e.g., “evolution”)
from those responses that referenced evolutionary concepts a separate code for the terms
(evolution term) was created. Although we did not specifically code for an expert understanding of evolutionary theory, any visitor that consistently provided the VIST subconcepts for each problem would be considered an expert. The evolutionary subconcept
variation was coded as a theme only if there was a reference to within-species variation.
References to differential survival, coded as selection, and differential inheritance, coded as
inheritance, were coded separately, as the content analysis indicated that visitors often referenced only one these concepts (both are required for a full understanding of natural selection). In the following example, variation and selection each appeared as two sentence
fragments (1–2):
FINCH EXAMPLE (INR) Visitor’s Response: . . . the finches with the larger beaks
survived [selection-1], I suppose—the ones who didn’t have large beaks [variation-1] died out [selection-2]—and so they kept propagating and the beaks got
larger and larger, which is good for them because they were able to get the tough
seeds, and the ones with the small beaks lost out [variation-2]. . .
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References to a common ancestor or descendent were coded as common descent, if it was
clear that these were different species. Any mention of the significance of time for biological change over generations, was coded as time. Sexual selection was included as an a priori
code, as it is the evolutionary mechanism that explains fruit-fly speciation. Random events
or chance and ecological pressure also emerged as themes in visitors’ responses.
Novice Naturalistic and Creationist Reasoning Patterns
Conceptual Framework
Although a more idiographic approach (Wandersee et al., 1994) prevailed in the coding of
the novice naturalistic and creationist reasoning patterns, coding was guided by a conceptual framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994), but we were also sensitive to the emergence of
previously unreported themes. First we describe the conceptual framework, and later we
describe the themes in detail. For the novice naturalistic reasoning pattern, coding focused on
the goal-directed and intentional explanatory concepts found in prior research, particularly in research with children. We argued earlier that there are important differences between these two conceptual systems; moreover, these differences become even more
critical when we consider the creationist reasoning pattern. Coding of the latter included references to supernatural causes, ranging from explicit statements about God’s creative powers to more implicit references to belief. However, as goal-directed and intentional concepts
are also essential to the expression of creationist ideas, we review some theoretical distinctions between the two. Finally, we provide evidence for the early emergence of these ideas
in young children.
Goal-directed reasoning is one of a family of teleological concepts that imply purpose,
a progression toward an endpoint or goal (see Mayr, 1982, pp. 47–51). Psychologically,
there is a key distinction to be made between internal/intrinsic and external/extrinsic teleological processes (for a philosophical equivalent, see Kampourakis & Zogza, 2007, p. 395).
Properties of living kinds serve the intrinsic purpose, or needs, of the organism itself,
whereas properties of artifacts serve the extrinsic purpose of a designer (Keil, 1994). The
shape of the butterfly’s wings, for example, helps the butterfly fly, whereas the shape of a
cup makes it easier for humans to drink liquids—the shape confers no benefit on the cup
itself, it just benefits the human designer.
A belief in God’s creation of the natural world can be derived, analogically, from this
kind of artificialist reasoning (Evans, 2000, 2001, 2008; Kelemen, 2004; Piaget, 1929): To the
extent that a living kind is thought to be designed, then it is treated as if it were an artifact.
Such explanations are embedded in a folk theory of intentionality. For it to become a creationist argument, it is necessary to incorporate a belief in a supernatural designer—God.
This example is illustrative of a synthetic model, in which ideas derived from an intuitive
psychology are fused with culturally available ideas about a supernatural being, a central
planner. This fusion both reinforces and amplifies the impact of creationist beliefs (Evans,
2001). Accordingly, references to the purposes or desires of a supernatural designer were
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coded under the creationist reasoning pattern. Whereas, naturalistic references to the intrinsic needs or desires of the organism itself were coded under the novice naturalistic
reasoning pattern.
What Do Children Say?
Given the core question regarding the prevalence in adult reasoning of intuitive concepts
found earlier in life, it is important to know what children say. When asked about the origins of “the very first Xs” (where X is an animal or a human), 5- to 7-year-olds from Christian fundamentalist communities simply stated that “God made it.” Their
nonfundamentalist counterparts often cited God, but they also stated that the animal “just
appeared,” or “came out of the ground” (Evans, 2000). It appears that children in this age
group do not necessarily grasp that the organisms were previously nonexistent; they explain where the animal came from, the proximate cause, rather than how it came into existence, the more distal or ultimate cause (Evans, 2000; Southerland, Abrams, Cummins, &
Anzelmo, 2001). In response to the same question, most 8- to 9-year-olds, regardless of
community background, give creationist responses. By early adolescence, children’s responses to this question reflected the beliefs of their community of origin. The “evolutionist” explanations of children from nonfundamentalist communities, however, were preDarwinian, referencing the intrinsic need of the organism to adapt. In addition to the effect
of parent beliefs, unique variance in children’s evolutionist ideas was explained by children’s exposure to evidence that animals change, from fossils, to adaptive change, to metamorphosis (Evans, 2000, 2001, 2008). While this evidence of biological change appeared
to challenge children’s intuitive essentialist ideas that animal kinds are fixed in time and
place, it also had the effect of reinforcing children’s intuitions about intrinsic needs. In contrast, Christian fundamentalist children’s intuitive essentialist ideas were reinforced by
their community belief system: “it can’t change, because God made it that way” (Evans,
2001). This interaction between community beliefs and children’s intuitive concepts yields
novel synthetic blends, reflecting the fusion of intuitive and cultural conceptions (Evans et
al., in press).
Given this analysis, in our coding scheme if visitors explained biological change as satisfying the needs of the organism, this was coded as a goal-directed novice naturalistic
theme. References to mental state explanations, such as thoughts and desires (e.g., “the ant
tried to find the fungus”), that align with the conscious intentions of the organism, were
coded as an intentional, novice naturalistic theme. On the other hand, if visitors referenced
God’s purpose, this was coded as a supernatural theme, which is intentional and teleological
but not naturalistic.
Codebook: Novice Naturalistic Reasoning (NNR)
Responses coded as NNR used intuitive naturalistic modes of reasoning to explain the
problems (see table 3). Goal-directed explanations that referenced the intrinsic needs or
goals of the organisms were coded separately from intentional explanations that referenced
mental states, skills, or a conscious effort to change. Both of these explanations referenced
individual change, not population change. Distinct forms of goal-directed reasoning
emerged in the coding process (Evans, 2005). In one theme, there was a clear analogy to
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developmental change or growth toward an end-point; in the other theme, the organism
changed its body or behavior in order to adjust to a novel environment (need-based adaptation). Another emergent theme, also found in children (Evans, 2000), was a simpler mode,
in which the visitor merely noted the adaptive relationship between the organism and the
environment but did not mention environmental change (static adaptation).
Table 3. Novice naturalistic reasoning pattern: themes, definitions, and examples
Theme

Operational Definition

Examples

Intentional

Use of mental states, skills, or
conscious effort to explain change

“. . . had to try and work harder,
probably, to develop their beaks”

Essentialist

Category-based induction (referencing species stability)

“Humans and chimps are the
same kind”

Static adaptation

References the organismenvironment fit as the reason a
particular organism might be
found in a particular location

“Well, this area is generally
colder and you find this type of
algae in this type of location”

Adaptive feature list

Simply lists adaptive features of
one or more organisms

“. . . toes and webbed feet for the
land, instead of fins, most whales
have fins . . .”

Goal-directed “need-based adaptation”

The organism changes to meet a
need or purpose, a functional or
adaptive goal-directed behavior

“The first fungus needed to be
protected from the second fungus
so it developed a natural defense
mechanism in the ant to stave it
off”

Goal-directed “develops”

The organism develops toward
an inbuilt goal [no mention of
need]

“As they grow they develop into
other types of HIV”

Proximate cause—agent

An agent brought the organism in
from some place else

“Obviously, people brought the
fruit flies in . . .”

Proximate cause—other

The organism was always there,
but was not detected

“The new strains of HIV were
there, scientists hadn’t seen
them”

Reproduction

Reference to reproduction or an
increase in numbers, no clear reference to inherited features

“Then they multiplied when they
got to Hawaii”

Hybridization

Two unrelated animals interbred

“Then the different kinds of flies
bred and they had different offspring”

An emergent theme, proximate cause, defined simply as a cause that immediately precedes the effect, was also evident in visitors’ transcripts. For example, accidental or intentional transmission by an animate agent was invoked to explain variation in the fly
population (e.g., “people brought the flies”). In effect, these visitors did not address the
“origins” question, in that they failed to recognize that an evolutionary cause was required;
they responded as if the organism was always here. If the visitor denied that any change
occurred, this was coded as proximate cause–other. This type of response has been noted in
children, as described earlier (Evans, 2000, 2008; Southerland et al., 2001). As neither of
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these proximate causes addressed Mayr’s (1982, pp. 67–68) concerns with proximate biological mechanisms that relate to the “functions of an organism and its parts,” they were
coded as novice themes.
Several other emergent novice themes included references to the stability of species (essentialist), their reproductive capacity (reproduction), and hybridization. One very common
response included repeated references to the adaptive features of organisms (rather than
the whole organism), which was simply coded as an adaptive features list.
Codebook: Creationist Reasoning Pattern (CR)
Responses invoking a supernatural rather than a naturalistic cause, citing God or the creative process were coded as creationist reasoning (see table 4). As described earlier, this
was an intentional and teleological mode of construal in which natural kinds were intentionally created to serve an extrinsic purpose: God’s purpose. They were, in effect, treated
as artifacts created by God. Typically, creationists who are Biblical literalists reject common
descent and argue that God created each organism a few thousand years ago with a specific
essence (essentialism) that is eternal and unchanging, or they reference intelligent design
(Evans, 2001, 2008). In addition to these themes, several more emerged during coding development. Overall we attempted to differentiate between themes expressed by sophisticated creationists who explicitly rejected evolutionary principles, and those expressed
more by more intuitive creationists who vaguely referenced their beliefs (see table 4 for
details).
Table 4. Creationist reasoning pattern: themes, definitions, examples
Theme

Operational Definition

Examples

God’s creation

God created each organism

“. . . God was the creator and he
designed and created every organism”

God’s variation

God created the diversity seen in
organisms

“God created the algae with the
DNA to expand into different
kinds”

God’s adaptation

God made organisms so that they
are adapted to fit in with their environment

“He created this almost symbiotic
relationship between the ant and
the fungus”

God’s essence

God created each organism with a
specific “essence” and it does not
change

“I think they were created as they
are with their own unique set of
chromosomes”

Young earth creationists

Specifically rejects geological time
and the age of the earth

“I don’t think the world is more
than 1,000 years old”

Rejects common descent

Rejects the idea of common ancestry or common descent

“Well, I wouldn’t believe the ancestor theory”

Intelligent design

Refers to the design of organisms
by a sentient entity, but no reference to God

No examples

Vague belief

Declaration of religious or biblical
belief—not explicit

“I believe in a catastrophic flood”
“I’m religious” “I am a Christian”
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Scoring
In sum, each of the three reasoning pattern was made up of distinct themes, with the number of themes differing by pattern. Each visitor’s response to a question about each of the
seven organisms (32 × 7 = 224 responses) might reference a theme from one or more of the
three reasoning patterns. For every response, each theme was coded as either present (1)
or absent (0). Therefore, even if a visitor repeated the same theme in his or her response to
the question on any one organism, it was coded as present once, only. Thus, for each visitor’s response to each question, the potential range for a single theme was 0–1. However,
one visitor could report the same theme (e.g., variation) seven times, once for each question/organism. If a visitor responded “Don’t Know” this response was coded as zero for
all themes for that particular question. Across all participants (and organisms), 601 nonrepeating conceptual units were identified that mapped onto distinct themes; in addition,
31 conceptual units were coded as “other.” The coding scheme successfully captured most
(95%) of the conceptual content of the visitors’ responses. In addition, four participants
responded “don’t know” to one of the questions and two more responded similarly to two
of the other questions, resulting in eight “don’t knows” (see table 5). For any one question/organism, the number of themes that any one visitor might potentially mention for
the informed naturalistic reasoning pattern (INR) could range from 0 to 9, for the novice
naturalistic reasoning pattern (NNR) the potential range was 0–10, and for the creationist
reasoning pattern (INR) the potential range was 0–8 (see tables 2–4).
Table 5. Response patterns for the seven organisms: percentage of participants endorsing a
particular pattern
INR
NNR CR
(%)

INR
CR
(%)

NNR
CR
(%)

Don’t
Know
(%)

44

0

0

0

6

28

3

0

3

9

3

44

0

6

0

3

6

38

0

0

0

0

13

0

66

0

3

0

0

22

19

0

47

0

6

0

6

Human

25

6

3

41

9

9

6

0

Average

17

27

2

44

2

3

1

3

CR
Only
(%)

Organism

INR
Only
(%)

NNR
Only
(%)

Virus

16

34

0

Diatom

19

38

0

Ant

9

34

Fly

9

47

Finch

19

Whale

INR
NNR
(%)

INR, informed naturalistic reasoning; NNR, novice naturalistic reasoning; CR, creationist reasoning.

Results: Part I, What Is the Nature of Visitors’ Reasoning Patterns?
The overall reasoning patterns are described first, followed by the most frequent themes
that visitors use for each reasoning pattern, along with examples.
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Overall Reasoning Patterns
Overall
None of the visitors employed any of the three main reasoning patterns exclusively across
all seven questions/organisms. Mixed reasoning patterns predominated for individuals
and for questions, as predicted (see fig. 1), with visitors using one pattern for one question
and another for a different question, or even using a mixed pattern for a single question.
Overall, the most common pattern for individual museum visitors was informed naturalistic/novice naturalistic reasoning (72%). A less common pattern was informed naturalistic/novice naturalistic/creationist reasoning (28%). While all of the visitors used mixed
patterns of reasoning, most of them exhibited a dominant reasoning mode, which they
used most frequently. Using this metric, 34% could be classified as consistent informed
naturalistic reasoners, 53% as consistent novice naturalistic reasoners, and 6% as creationist reasoners (6% were equally novice and informed naturalistic reasoners).
Reasoning Patterns by Organism
Even if visitors changed their reasoning pattern from one question to the next, they could
still apply one pattern exclusively to each question/organism. In table 5, the percentage of
participants using a particular pattern for each organism is shown. The predominant profile is still a mixed novice/informed naturalistic reasoning pattern with 44% of participants
using it on average, ranging from 28% for the diatom to 66% for the finch. Yet, as seen in
this table, participants often employed a single reasoning pattern for a particular organism.
Again, novice naturalistic reasoning predominates, with 27% of participants, on average,
using this reasoning pattern exclusively, ranging from 6% for the human to 47% for the fly.
The virus, diatom, ant, and fly were the most likely to elicit this pattern. The informed
naturalistic reasoning pattern was used exclusively by 17% of the participants, on average,
across the seven questions. The human (25%) was the most likely to elicit this pattern and
the ant (9%) and fly (9%) least likely to do so. Creationist reasoning was most often used
for the human, usually in combination with the other patterns.
Another way of presenting this information, which maintains the focus on each organism, is to ask what percent of the participants endorse at least one theme from each of the
three reasoning patterns, for each organism. The results are averaged across the 32 visitors
for each organism and presented in a single figure, with the organisms arranged from the
smallest to the largest. As can be seen in figure 2, the finch, human, and whale are most
likely to elicit a theme from the informed naturalistic pattern (INR), while the other organisms are more likely to elicit novice naturalistic themes (NNR); the human is most likely to
elicit a creationist theme (CR).
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Figure 2. The percentage of participants endorsing at least one theme from each of the
three reasoning patterns, for each organism.

This finding suggests a divide between single-celled/invertebrate and vertebrate animals. Taking into account the results from the pilot study, it appears that, regardless of
familiarity or interest, invertebrate organisms elicit novice naturalistic reasoning and vertebrates more informed reasoning. In the pilot study, visitors’ interest and biological
knowledge cut across these groupings. The fly and the finch were the first two questions
presented, therefore there does not appear to be an effect of presentation order. The wording of the questions differed from one organism to another, but not in a way that would
clearly predict these findings. Additionally, as predicted, the human was most likely to
elicit creationist reasoning.
Themes and Reasoning Patterns
So far our results have demonstrated that mixed reasoning patterns prevail. In this section,
the focus is on a description of the themes most likely to be endorsed for each reasoning
pattern. A list of the themes endorsed by 20% or more of the sample for the informed and
novice naturalistic reasoning patterns can be seen in table 6. Given the comparative rarity
of creationist responses, all creationist themes mentioned by 6% of the sample, or more,
were included in the table. Summing across all seven organisms, the mean and standard
deviation for the number of themes (recall that each theme was coded as present or absent
for each question/organism) mentioned by each visitor, for each reasoning pattern was:
INR (M = 9.4, SD = 6.1, Range 2–25), NNR (M = 8.1, SD = 4.3, Range 1–19), and CR (M = 1.3,
SD = 3.5, Range 0–16). For ease of presentation, under the novice naturalistic reasoner pattern, two similar themes, need-based adaptation and development, were combined under
a “goal-directed” theme and the two proximate cause themes (agent and other) were also
combined (see table 6).
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Table 6. For each organism, the main themes for the naturalistic and informed reasoning
patterns (endorsed by 20% or more of participants), and for the creationist reasoning pattern
(endorsed by 6% or more of participants)
Informed Naturalistic
Reasoning

Novice Naturalistic
Reasoning

Creationist
Reasoning

Virus

Variation (38%)
Ecological press. (22%)

Proximate cause (34%)
Goal directed (22%)
Reproduction (22%)

None

Diatom

Ecological press. (31%)
Evolution term (22%)

Static adaptation (53%)
Proximate cause (31%)

Vague belief (6%)

Ant

Evolution term (28%)
Selection (22%)

Static adaptation (53%)
Goal directed (41%)

God’s creation (6%)
God’s adaptation (6%)

Fly

Evolution term (25%)
Variation (25%)
Time (22%)

Proximate cause (50%)
Reproduction (34%)
Hybridization (22%)

Young earthers (6%)
Vague belief (6%)

Finch

Ecological press. (62%)
Evolution term (50%)
Selection (44%)
Variation (25%)

Goal directed (53%)
Reproduction (22%)

Human

Evolution term (56%)
Common descent (38%)
Time (28%)
Ecological press. (25%)

Adaptive features (44%)
Goal directed (22%)

Whale

Ecological press. (47%)
Evolution term (47%)
Common descent (25%)
Time (25%)

Static adaptation (34%)
Adaptive features (34%)
Goal directed (28%)

Organism

Rejects descent (22%)
Vague belief (16%)
God’s creation (9%)
God’s essence (6%)
Young earthers (6%)

Informed Naturalistic Reasoning (INR) Pattern (Table 2)
The most frequent themes from the informed naturalistic reasoning pattern, summed
across all organisms and averaged across visitors, were: evolution terms (M = 2.3, SD = 2.0,
Range 0–7), and the concepts of ecological pressure (M = 2.0, SD = 1.5, Range 0–6), variation
(M = 1.4, SD = 1.6, Range 0–5), time (M = 1.3, SD = 1.5, Range 0–5), selection (M = 1.0, SD =
1.4, Range 0–5), and common descent (M = 0.8, SD = 0.8, Range 0–2) (see table 2). Sexual
selection was never mentioned; inheritance and chance were mentioned by fewer than
20%.
Evolution Terms
Evolution terms were the most frequently mentioned INR theme. In figure 3 the percentage of visitors endorsing at least one evolution term for each organism is presented. The
most frequent evolution terms were: evolution, Darwin(ian), and survival of the fittest (although the latter is technically incorrect, for the purposes of this study we included it).
Typically visitors did not mention VIST terms though they did describe them conceptually.
Between 47% and 56% of the museum visitors used an evolution term to explain the finch,
human, and whale biological change problems. For the other organisms, visitors invoked
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such terms less often (6–28%). Presentation order was unlikely to have influenced this pattern, as the human and whale were presented last and the finch second.

Figure 3. Percentage of participants using evolutionary terms for each organism (+SEM).

Variation and Selection
In terms of the VIST concepts, the most commonly invoked were: variation, time, and selection. Fewer than 40% of the sample invoked the concept of within-species variation (see
table 2). It was most likely to be associated with the virus (38%), the fly (25%), and the finch
(25%) (table 6). A more stringent test of evolutionary reasoning is the application of a natural selection theme. In figure 4 the percentage of participants who mentioned a selection
theme for each organism is presented (see also table 6). The finch (44%) was the only organism that elicited a significant number of selection responses. None of the visitors applied a selection theme to the virus and, with the exception of the ant (22%), fewer than
20% applied it to the other organisms. The information provided in the finch question
probably helped elicit such responses but only for those participants who were ready to
recognize the selectionist contingencies. See the following example:
FINCH: Well, in that case I would assume that the birds evolved [Evolutionary
Term]—well, the birds with the larger beaks [Variation] were the ones better able
to survive, since the larger beaks were more useful in getting the seeds. So that
trait is the one that was selected for, and the birds that had the smaller beaks died
out [Selection], I would assume.
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Figure 4. Percentage of participants using a selection theme for each organism (+SEM).

Time
Specific information about time was incorporated into all of the problems to some degree.
Fewer than 30% of the visitors, however, regularly invoked time in their responses to the
problems (see table 6). The fly (22%), whale (25%), and the human (28%) problems elicited
time responses in more than 20% of the sample. The consistent creationists (Young
Earthers—see table 4) routinely denied the possibility of geological time. In the case of the
finch there was an interesting negative reference to time; a few participants did not think
that there had been enough time for “evolution” to occur, as in the following example:
FINCH: Well, you wouldn’t expect to see evolution occurring so rapidly . . .
Common Descent
The whale and the human/chimp problems were the only ones that explicitly incorporated
information about common ancestors into the question. Even so, visitors were either reluctant or unable to use that information to explain the problem: Whale (25%), human/chimp
(38%) (see table 6). Additionally, some visitors who did address common descent for the
human/chimp problem were genuinely puzzled as to how the “chimps” could still be here.
In this common misunderstanding, visitors failed to realize that apes and humans have a
common ancestor that is neither chimp nor human, as follows:
HUMAN/CHIMP: . . . I just got done saying that everything else can evolve over
time to fit the environment, but if we evolved over time from the chimp, I guess
my big question is why is the chimp still here in his original form. Like on the
other ones, they evolved and their earlier format disappeared. The chimp hasn’t
disappeared, he has continued to survive as he is. So, I don’t know how I would
explain that we evolved from them . . .
Ecological Pressure
Based on earlier research, we had hypothesized that the realization that changed environments exert significant pressure on organisms is an important insight, which is not necessarily accompanied by an understanding of natural selection, per se. In the development
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of the coding system we had observed three kinds of themes that addressed the environment, one of which, ecological pressures, we coded as informed naturalistic reasoning. In
this case, participants might note differences in habitats and their effects on organisms
(Flies: “the fact that there’s lots of different fruit”; Finches: “they adapted fairly quickly to
the change in food”). The theme, ecological pressure, was elicited by most of the organisms
(see table 6): finches (62%), whale (47%), diatom (31%), human (25%), and virus (22%).
Novice Naturalistic Reasoning (NNR) Pattern (Table 3)
As described earlier, the virus, diatom, ant, and fly were more likely to invoke an NNR
pattern (see fig. 2). The most frequent themes from the novice naturalistic reasoning pattern, summed across all organisms and averaged across visitors, were (see tables 3 and 6):
static adaptation (M = 1.7, SD = 1.1, Range 0–4), need-based adaptation (M = 1.6, SD = 1.6,
Range 0–6), proximate cause agent/other (M = 1.5, SD = 1.2, Range 0–5), adaptive feature
list (M = 1.0, SD = 1.1, Range 0–4), and reproduction (M = 1.0, SD = 1.0, Range 0–3). The first
three themes are also prevalent in children’s reasoning patterns (Evans, 2001, 2008).

Figure 5. Percentage of participants using goal-directed themes for each organism
(+SEM).

Goal-Directed Responses
The classic misconstrual of Darwinian evolution is the adaptationist response in which the
individual organism adapts itself to environmental conditions, which we have called needbased adaptation. For ease of presentation, we combined responses for this more prevalent
theme with the less prevalent development theme (see table 3) and called them goaldirected responses, as they both imply progression toward a goal. In figure 5, the percentage of participants endorsing a goal-directed theme at least once for each organism is presented. The two organisms most likely to elicit this response were the finch (53%) and the
ant (41%). Typically these responses referenced an endogenous process in which new features just emerge, grow, or develop when the need arises:
FINCH: Evolution for survival. . . . Well, in order to survive, their body parts had
to adjust to certain things, similar to the way giraffes’ necks probably grew long
as they reached for the plants at the top of the trees, so the beak grew longer in
order to deal with the tougher seeds.
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ANT: The first fungus needed to be protected from the second fungus, so it developed a natural defense mechanism in the ant in order to stave it off.
Proximate Cause
Two kinds of proximate cause themes were identified: agent and other. In figure 6 the percentage of participants endorsing either type of proximate cause at least once for each organism
is presented (see also table 6). Fifty percent of the visitors applied this theme to the fruit fly
and just over 30% applied it to the virus and diatom. For the virus, visitors tended to deny
that the scientists were correct in their assessment that the organism did not exist: “They
were there but they weren’t detected” (proximate cause–other). The assumption that the
organism was always present (but some place where it could not be seen) is illustrated in
the following example. The visitor responds as if the organism always existed, but just had
to be transported from someplace else (proximate cause-agent), a pattern also seen in
younger populations (Evans, 2000, 2001).
FRUIT FLIES: Obviously people have brought the fruit flies in. And Dole probably, Dole pineapple people probably brought them in.
Reproduction
These themes were elicited mostly by the fly (34%), finch (22%), and virus (22%). They
could easily be distinguished from inheritance. For reproduction, visitors merely referenced the multiplication of the species but did not refer to the passing on of traits from one
generation to the next, as in the following example (which also included hybridization).
FRUIT FLIES: However they came here I don’t know, but they just started mating and then they cross mated as far as animals do, I’m guessing.
Ecological Responses: Static Adaptation and Adaptive Features List
The two environmental responses that were coded under the NNR pattern were static adaptation and adaptive features list (see table 3). For static adaptation, visitors typically just
referenced the environment-organism fit without noting changes in environmental conditions. This was most often applied to the diatom (53%: “this type of algae grows better in
colder climates”), the ant (53%), and the whale (34%). In the case of adaptive features list,
visitors merely listed adaptive features of organisms. This was most often found for the
whale (34%) and the human (44%).
WHALE: The webbed feet, it once was a land, maybe, um . . . toes and webbed feet
instead of fins, most whales have fins, dorsal fins, so if he was once a land animal.
But the hippo is hoofed, so it must have something to do with, maybe the vertebrae . . .
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Figure 6. Percentage of participants using proximate causes for each organism (+SEM).

Creationist Reasoning Patterns (Table 4)
A creationist theme was mentioned by 28% of the visitors. In figure 2 the percentage of
participants endorsing a creationist reasoning theme at least once for each organism is presented. The virus never invoked a creationist response, whereas the chimp/human was the
most likely to do so (see table 6). When confronted with a possible relationship between
the chimp and the human, many participants expressed a range of responses from outright
rejection of common descent (22%) to a vague doubt (16%), as in the following example of
mixed reasoning:
HUMAN/CHIMP: I don’t believe that they do, because I don’t believe necessarily in evolution. I mean yes, I believe there’s a Darwinism where the stronger
species survived, but, I’m Christian so I believe God created man and God created chimpanzees [CR/INR]
Interestingly, one of the more consistent creationist reasoners shifted between a creationist and selectionist response for the finch, as in the following example:
FINCH: That’s a good question. I probably can’t explain that. But like I said, because of my biblical world view, I don’t believe in evolution. So I don’t believe
that they evolved because it takes too long. There are too many failures before
they evolve into something that finally works, so I just reject that view. Um, my
guess would be that there probably were larger beaked finches but there weren’t
as many of them and the small beaked ones would have died out because they
couldn’t get the food. But I don’t think that it went the other way—that there
were no large beaks and so they grew into large beaks. So is that clear enough?
[CR/INR]
The following creationist reasoner acknowledged variation in a population, but ascribed it to God’s intervention: God built it into the DNA.
FRUIT FLY: Um, first of all I have a problem with your 8 million years. I believe
in creation in the biblical account, so that pretty well defines how I believe things.
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God created them and due to the great flood, that is how the diversity came and
that would be my explanation. . . . OK, I believe um, God created a pair, a male
and female of everything with the ability to diversify. So I guess what I meant at
the time of the flood, I believe that’s when the continents broke apart and so even
though only a few of each things were saved in the flood, they had the genetic
background to be able to diversify into all of the, like for instance, dogs, and all
the different kinds that we have. And so um, does that help? Just a creationistic
view.
Results: Part II, Are Visitors’ Frameworks Coherent?
First, the second overall research question, which was whether visitors’ endorsement of
mixed reasoning patterns was coherent (see Vosniadou et al., 2008) or fragmented (see
diSessa, 2008) is addressed. Next, given that mixed reasoning patterns prevailed in visitors’
responses, these analyses also allowed us to examine whether certain themes might represent a transition or bridge between reasoning patterns; that is, whether there were significant correlations, either negative or positive, between particular themes from two different
reasoning patterns.
To assess whether visitors’ responses were coherent, hypotheses regarding the relationship between the major reasoning patterns and particular themes were evaluated using
zero-order correlations. Only themes that were conceptually central to each of the main
patterns and were endorsed by 20% or more of the sample are presented in table 7. This
evaluation was achieved by assessing the relationship between the overall patterns (measured as the percent of total themes committed to each pattern), and the main themes (measured as the number of times each theme was endorsed across questions, with a possible
range of 0–7 per participant).
Following a brief discussion of the relationship between the reasoning patterns and the
demographic variables, we then discuss each of the three major reasoning patterns in turn.
Conceptually central themes were those hypothesized to be key indicators of a particular
reasoning pattern. In part, these were identified on the basis of previous research. The
overall pattern of intercorrelations, excluding the demographic variables, is presented in
table 7.
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For informed naturalistic reasoning, the focus was on the VIST concepts, particularly
variation and common descent, because endorsement of these themes indicated that intuitive essentialist constraints that animal kinds cannot change had been modified. Likewise
an endorsement of selection suggested that visitors were no longer endorsing intuitive
goal-directed reasoning, which could be verified by assessing the relations between those
two variables. For the novice naturalistic reasoning pattern, the focal question, as described
earlier, was whether goal-directed reasoning was the most diagnostic of that pattern.
Given the emergent themes in Part I, of additional interest was the extent to which visitors
were sensitive to environmental issues, which are key to grasping evolutionary change;
these included ecological pressures, for the informed reasoning pattern, and adaptation
for the novice pattern. Analyses of the latter variables were exploratory; similarly, exploratory analyses of conceptually interesting variables, even if endorsed by less than 20% of
the sample, were included.
Demographic Variables
Older participants tended to be more highly educated (r = 0.41, p = 0.03). Additionally, the
number of museum visits made by the visitors was positively related to their use of evolutionary terms (r = 0.36, p < 0.05). There were no other significant relationships.
Informed Naturalistic Reasoning (INR) Pattern
Given that the VIST concepts are core evolutionary concepts (Futuyma, 1998), it was predicted that they would be central to the informed naturalistic reasoning pattern and that
they would be positively correlated with the overall INR pattern and negatively correlated
with the novice (NNR) reasoning pattern. (The pattern of intercorrelations between the
most prevalent INR themes—variables 1–6—and the overall reasoning patterns—variables
11–13—can be found in table 7). As described earlier, creationist reasoners may endorse
selection, an INR concept, providing they construe it as within-species change, but reject
common descent, another INR concept, because they view God as the exclusive creator of
new forms of life (Jones, 2005). If these hypotheses hold, then the overall INR and CR patterns would be uncorrelated.
Evolution terms (Var. 1), variation (Var. 2), and selection (Var. 4) were significantly positively correlated with the overall informed (INR) pattern, negatively correlated with the
novice (NNR) pattern, and uncorrelated with the creationist (CR) pattern (table 7). These
seemed to be diagnostic concepts for distinguishing between informed and novice reasoning. On the other hand, common descent (Var. 3) and ecological pressures (Var. 6) were
negatively correlated (p < 0.06) with the CR pattern, but were not clearly diagnostic of the
informed reasoning pattern. Notably, selection and common descent were uncorrelated.
Based on earlier descriptions of creationist reasoning patterns, this pattern was predictable because, as described, some creationist reasoners endorse selection (God created the
potential for diversity in DNA) but reject common descent, which, for them, is the definition of evolution (Jones, 2005). Also, creationist reasoners’ mention of evolutionary terms
was usually done in a negative fashion; it did indicate, however, their recognition that the
problems required more than a proximate cause explanation, even while they provided
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God as the final cause. The time concept (Var. 5) was significantly related to informed naturalistic reasoning but uncorrelated with the other patterns. Some participants mentioned
time along with common descent, which is reflected in the significant positive relationship
between these variables. Yet, although other participants seemed to recognize the importance of the time concept, they were unable to frame it in evolutionary terms. Variation
and time were also significantly related.
The significant positive relationship between selection, variation, and time (table 7), and
selection and inheritance (r = 0.36; p < 0.05) indicates that participants often accessed the
full VIST framework, in a coherent manner, even if they did not do so across all the questions.
Novice Naturalistic Reasoning (NNR) Pattern
Based on prior research with children and adults, one clear prediction was that goal directed reasoning (Var. 9) should be positively correlated with the overall NNR pattern and
negatively correlated with the other two patterns. This was the case. (The pattern of intercorrelations between the most prevalent NNR themes—variables 7–10—and the overall
reasoning patterns—variables 11–13—can be found in table 7).
Moreover, goal-directed reasoning was significantly negatively correlated with the selection theme, which demonstrates that visitors who understood natural selection were
less likely to use goal-directed language when explaining evolutionary problems. One possible interpretation of this pattern is that differential survival, which means some individuals in the population die, is incompatible with purpose. Goal-directed reasoning was also
positively correlated with all the ecological variables: the informed ecological pressures
theme, as well as the two novice themes, static adaptation (Var. 7), and adaptive features
(Var. 8). A possible interpretation of this pattern is that for the goal-directed reasoner the
goal or purpose is adaptation to the environment. Thus the recognition that the environment is a critical component in evolutionary change appears to be a crucial transitional
step in the shift from a novice to an informed reasoning pattern. Intentional/mental state
reasoning was not one of the main themes (mentioned by fewer than 20% of sample), but
it was positively correlated with goal-directed reasoning (r = 0.48; p < 0.01), particularly
need-based adaptation (r = 0.52; p < 0.01), and the adaptive feature list (r = 0.46; p < 0.01),
but not with any of the other variables.
The significant positive relations between the two NNR themes, static adaptation (Var.
7) and adaptive features (Var. 8), and common descent, an INR theme, indicates that those
novice reasoners who acknowledged the importance of the environment also endorsed
common descent. In addition, the overall negative relationship between the NNR reasoning pattern and selection, suggests that they did not grasp the evolutionary mechanism,
natural selection. Overall, as predicted, the novice reasoner was most likely to suggest
goal-directed mechanisms of change.
Proximate cause (Var. 10) reasoning was not diagnostic of any particular reasoning pattern. It appeared to be a causal explanation associated with either evolutionary or creationist reasoning. To have a full explanation for any particular biological phenomena, both
proximate and evolutionary causes are necessary. What is noticeable in the results described in Part I is that participants were more likely to use proximate cause reasoning for
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the organisms (virus, diatom, ant, fly) for which they lacked any kind of evolutionary explanation.
Creationist Reasoning (CR) Pattern
The pattern of intercorrelations between the creationist reasoning pattern (CR) and the
other variables can be seen in table 7 (Var. 13). As there were few creationist themes, they
were not presented individually but as a composite variable only. Complicating this reasoning pattern, the previous results demonstrate that some participants, who were not Biblical literalists, expressed creationist ideas for the human/chimp question but were
naturalistic reasoners for the other questions. The few consistent creationist reasoners in
this sample, who were highly sophisticated Biblical literalists, were very clear that they
endorsed variation within species but not common descent or geological time. (Unfortunately, with this small sample of creationist reasoners it is not possible to distinguish these
two groups in the pattern of correlations.)
Of particular interest was the significant negative relationship between goal-directed
reasoning and creationist reasoning (see table 6), which was predicted earlier. Creationist
reasoners did not endorse the idea that goals are intrinsic to the organisms themselves,
even while they endorse the idea that God created species for an extrinsic purpose (like
artifacts). Such a pattern is consistent with the theoretical analysis, described in Part I, of a
dissociation between intentional and goal-directed reasoning, with the former related to
extrinsic goals (and creationism) and the latter to intrinsic goals (and an intuitive biology).
Relatedly, the negative relationship between ecological pressures and creationism (see table 7) is consistent with the essentialist idea that God created a stable unchanging world.
It also represents a refusal to acknowledge one of the natural extrinsic causes of speciation
(and common descent)—environmental change. Finally, this negative relationship provides support for the decision to code the ecological pressures theme under the informed
naturalistic reasoning pattern.
General Discussion
If a well-educated population of people who are interested enough to go to a natural history museum fail to understand basic evolutionary principles, then it bodes ill for the population at large. Unlike the general population, which typically registers 45% against
evolution (Gallup, 2007), these natural history museum visitors were much less likely to
reject evolutionary theory. Only 28% indicated discomfort with evolutionary principles.
This finding accords with reports from museums where visitor studies on the topic of evolution have been conducted (Spiegel et al., 2006).
On the other hand, while the majority accepted evolutionary ideas, only a third could
be said to have a reasonable grasp of Darwinian evolutionary mechanisms. Not one visitor
consistently used evolutionary reasoning to explain all seven problems. This is unlikely to
be the consequence of a lack of interest in or exposure to the pertinent content. These natural history museum visitors were more highly educated than the population at large, and
the pilot study demonstrated that they were also interested in and relatively knowledgea-
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ble about the organisms and concepts presented in the study, to the extent that they provided biological descriptions of the terms. Moreover, the more frequently they visited natural history museums, the more likely they were to spontaneously mention evolution
terms. We shall argue, instead, that consistent with our earlier theoretical analysis, these
findings result from the conceptual difficulty of Darwinian ideas, which run counter to
commonsense (Evans, 2001; Bloom & Weisberg, 2007; Mayr, 1982, pp. 514–519). That the
same pattern of misunderstandings is found among adult museum visitors in Canada and
Australia, which have a much higher acceptance rate of evolutionary origins, provides
support for this position (Abrahams-Silver & Kisiel, 2008). Before addressing the implications these findings might have for informal and formal science education, we summarize
the overall results and address their theoretical implications.
Overall Findings
To address the main purpose of this study, in Part I of the analyses we profiled the reasoning patterns of museum visitors. This analysis was based on a theoretical model (see fig. 1)
in which intuitive modes of reasoning, present in childhood, interact with the cultural influences of religion, especially Biblical literalism, and science to produce distinct reasoning
patterns. As hypothesized, we found that the typical visitor used mixed patterns of reasoning, depending on the organism.
Visitors who used informed naturalistic reasoning themes when explaining evolutionary change in mammals and birds, often used novice naturalistic reasoning themes for invertebrate or microscopic species. The most frequent novice themes were those also found
in children’s intuitive beliefs (Evans, 2001, 2008), which appear to persist in adulthood.
Creationist reasoning was used most frequently when explaining human evolution, alone
or in combination with novice and/or informed naturalistic reasoning. The overlapping
circles in the model (see fig. 1) capture some of these more nuanced positions: there is no
single path to an understanding of evolutionary change but many possible transitions.
Overall, visitors used one or more of these reasoning patterns in different permutations
across the seven organisms. Seventy-two percent used a combination of informed naturalistic reasoning and novice naturalistic reasoning to explain the evolutionary problems. Just
over one-quarter used a combination of creationist reasoning with one or both of the naturalistic reasoning patterns. One third, however, did use informed naturalistic reasoning
in more than 50% of their responses. These results indicate that about two-thirds of these
museum visitors were unlikely to spontaneously invoke a Darwinian evolutionary explanation to solve a biological change problem. Of this group, a minority were creationists,
while the majority invoked novice modes of reasoning.
Each of the seven organisms elicited a distinctive reasoning pattern. The finch, human,
and whale were most likely to elicit an evolutionary term, with the finch most likely to
invoke a selectionist concept. The human and whale questions explicitly addressed macroevolutionary processes and were also the most likely to elicit the common descent theme.
In contrast with the vertebrates, the ant, fly, diatom, and virus questions were more likely
to elicit novice naturalistic reasoning, with the latter three organisms often eliciting a proximate cause theme. In these cases, the visitors did not seem to recognize that an evolutionary explanation was needed to explain the presence of new species, a pattern also found
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in childhood (Evans, 2000; Southerland et al., 2001). Creationist reasoners fell into two
groups. One was a sophisticated vocal minority, who rejected most references to evolution,
especially common descent, and who explained variation as part of God’s plan. For the
majority of creationist reasoners, however, their reasoning was organism specific: humans
were created by God, while the other organisms evolved.
A common complaint in the science education research literature (e.g., Bishop & Anderson, 1990; Greene, 1990) is that students do not understand the importance of chance or
randomness, so we were interested to see whether visitors would spontaneously evoke
this concept. Fewer than 20% of the visitors did so. Nor did the idea of sexual selection
spontaneously occur to any of the visitors, though this is a central concept in fruit fly speciation.
Theoretical Implications
Bridges to an Evolutionary Understanding?
In Part II of the analyses, we focused on the coherence of the patterns by assessing the
interrelationships between themes from the three reasoning patterns. One interpretation
of these findings was that two themes in particular, goal-directedness and variation, were
key transitional concepts, bridging the gap between novice reasoning patterns and informed reasoning patterns.
The finding that creationist reasoners endorsed selection (as differential survival) and
rejected common descent, while novice naturalistic reasoners endorsed common descent
but not selection, indicates an interesting disassociation between these two evolutionary
themes. Further, common descent as well as goal-directed reasoning were positively related to all ecological variables from both the informed and the novice reasoning patterns.
As argued earlier, this pattern suggests that novice reasoners who recognized the importance of ecological pressures endorsed common descent but utilized goal-directedness
as the mechanism of evolutionary change rather than natural selection. In effect, they expressed pre-Darwinian ideas of evolutionary change. Goal-directed reasoning is a process
that is intrinsic to the organism, with the goal being adaptation to a changed environment.
Creationist reasoners, in contrast, did not endorse goal-directed reasoning or the ecological
variables.
These findings provide support for the thesis that goal-directed reasoning and the related recognition of ecological pressures are important bridges to a Darwinian understanding of evolution, particularly natural selection (Evans, 2008). The significant negative
correlation between goal-directed themes and the selection theme indicates that the latter
directly supplants the former as the mechanism of change. For the majority of visitors, the
goal-directed theme was one in which, of necessity, the organism needed to change in order to survive in a changed environment. Importantly, this was not an intentional concept
that reflected the organism’s conscious desire or intent to change. The latter was coded
separately from goal-directedness and was rarely expressed by the visitors. As described
earlier, the ability to distinguish between goal-directed reasoning, from an intuitive biology, and intentional (mental state) reasoning, from an intuitive psychology, appears to be
a crucial step in gaining a handle on evolutionary thinking in childhood (Evans, 2008).
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Once visitors, of any age, realize that the organism’s survival in a changed environment
depends on its possession of particular features, then they are in a position to grasp key
aspects of natural selection: differential survival and differential reproduction.
Given that these intuitive beliefs appear to constrain current thinking on evolution, it is
likely that they exerted similar effects in historical contexts. Thus, it would not be surprising if similar patterns of conceptual change were found historically. Goal-directed reasoning, as a progressive theme, was a dominant idea among the assortment of teleological
evolutionary ideas that were part of the intellectual milieu influencing Darwin (Bowler,
2009; Chambers, 1994; Mayr, 1982, pp. 47–51). Yet, even in the historical context, it was
considered important to exclude terms indicating that change came about because of an
organism’s conscious desire for change. Lamarck, for example, did not endorse wants but
did endorse needs (Evans, 2001; Kampourakis & Zogza, 2007): “One misconstrual was that
he [Lamarck] claimed animals have an inherent power to enlarge organs or capacities in
response to their wants (a misreading of the French besoins)” (Quammen, 2006, p. 71). This
historical analysis is evidence that an acceptance of evolutionary ideas and an understanding of the mechanisms do not go hand in hand.
From an essentialist perspective (Mayr, 1982, pp. 304–305), natural kinds (in this case,
species) are endowed with an underlying essence that gives members of a particular kind
distinctive features that are stable and unchanging. It follows, therefore, that one kind cannot change into another, which makes evolutionary change, particularly common descent,
strongly counterintuitive (Evans, 2000, 2001, 2008; Mayr, 1982). Essentialist beliefs are characteristic of childhood reasoning (Gelman, 2003). Individuals who are strongly essentialist
tend to focus on features that are common to a species and ignore small differences between individual organisms. Given this perspective, and in contrast with previous researchers, we coded for a variation concept independently of the idea of randomness. The
realization that small differences among members of a species are key to differential survival and reproduction is an important insight, one that does not depend on an understanding of the genetic origin of those differences (of which Darwin was ignorant). Of all
the VIST subconcepts, we found that variation was the one most likely to be mentioned by
informed naturalistic reasoners, which distinguished them from the novice naturalistic
reasoners (see also Shtulman & Schulz, 2008).
In keeping with prior research (Evans, 2000, 2008), this finding suggests that highlighting within-species variation provides an important means of modifying an essentialist perspective, one that could provide a bridge between the novice- and informed-naturalistic
reasoning patterns. There is a crucial caveat: creationist reasoners also endorse variation
and differential survival but within a different framework. Some visitors in this study
claimed that God built the capacity for variation into the DNA: “OK, I believe, um, God
created a pair, a male and female of everything with the ability to diversify”; “God created
the algae with the DNA to expand into different kinds.” This nuanced means of reconciling
the obvious fact of within-species variation with a creationist perspective is common
among members of a sophisticated creationist community (Jones, 2005; Morris & Parker,
1982). The expression of this diversity is limited to members of a particular kind, where a
kind is defined, for example, as all wolf-dogs from dachshunds to dingoes. It does not
extend to change from one kind of animal to another, such as from land animals to whales.

33

EVANS ET AL., JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN SCIENCE TEACHING 47:3 (2010)

The latter change runs counter to the fundamentalist belief that each kind was endowed
by God with a unique essence (Numbers, 1992), which, it is argued, is a cultural extension
of the essentialist intuition that species are stable and do not change.
Explanatory Coherence or Fragmentary Knowledge?
One feature of informed naturalistic reasoning was the rudimentary nature of the
knowledge base. Such reasoning provided an opportunity to examine the conceptual underpinnings of what have been called fragmented (diSessa et al., 2004) or synthetic concepts (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992), which may well be typical of the layperson’s
understanding of most scientific topics. Our coding of selection, for example, focused on
differential survival, rather than differential survival and differential reproduction (the latter was captured in the inheritance code). The relative strength of the relationships between the VIST subconcepts and the overall pattern indicates that variation and selection
(as differential survival) were the most characteristic of the informed reasoning pattern.
Yet, while the visitors may have accessed the concept of within-species variation and differential survival, they did not consistently use this knowledge to explain the diverse evolutionary problems encountered in the study. Nor did they consistently tie their
knowledge of variation and selection to the other related concepts, inheritance and time.
Part of the problem was visitors’ failure to recognize that all the biological change problems that we presented to them were variations on one theme: Darwinian evolution. Often
their solution was to offer proximate cause explanations rather than ultimate or evolutionary cause explanations, especially for invertebrates (Evans, 2001; Southerland et al., 2001;
Mayr, 1982, p. 67).
Overall, these findings suggest that in the process of assimilating strongly counterintuitive ideas, such as evolutionary concepts, to an intuitive set of beliefs, locally coherent
models are constructed (Evans et al., in press; Vosniadou et al., 2008). These synthetic
blends often give the appearance of fragmented beliefs, in the sense that visitors may have
accessed only one of the VIST subconcepts. But the significant correlations between key
variables from novice and informed reasoning patterns indicate that the resulting pattern
was coherent, which might well be typical of synthetic concepts (Vosniadou et al., 2008).
Conversely, some visitors were clearly struggling, especially those who listed adaptive
features of organisms but did not tie them sensibly to the question at hand. These were the
visitors who were more likely to use intentional-mental-state-reasoning, with explanations
that are best described as fragmented (diSessa et al., 2004).
In sum, we propose that whether visitors’ reasoning seems fragmented or coherent depends on where they are in their understanding of the problem at hand. They have access
to multiple representations (Evans, 2000, 2008; Legare & Gelman, 2008) of biological
change: novice and informed naturalistic models as well as creationist models. How these
models are integrated and utilized clearly depend on the visitors’ interpretation of the
problem as well as on the explanatory depth of the underlying knowledge structures. The
integration of intuitive and cultural (religious or scientific) beliefs is a long process, one
which might well follow a developmental trajectory. The gap between intuitive and expert
conceptions appears to be bridged by a variety of transitional concepts, reflecting various
blends of intuitive, scientific, and creationist ideas (Evans et al., in press). In figure 1, such
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states are indicated by the overlapping circles. Charting the process of conceptual change
requires, at a minimum, better theories of how learners manage to integrate multiple models to solve problems.
Implications for Science Education
If belief in evolution means simply assenting to microevolution, small changes
over time within a species, . . . I believe it to be true. [But] Man was not an accident and reflects an image and likeness unique in the created order. Those aspects of evolutionary theory compatible with this truth are a welcome addition
to human knowledge. (Brownback, 2007)
A key observation from these studies is that the majority of museum visitors do not realize
that the term evolution applies to both microevolutionary and macroevolutionary processes; in fact, they are more likely to apply this term to the latter process. Moreover, as in
the above quote and seen in these studies, creationist reasoners may accept microevolution
but not macroevolution, whereas novice naturalistic reasoners may accept the latter but
misunderstand the former.
There are several reasons why this disassociation occurs, all of which point to the necessity of linking the two concepts in a variety of settings. Biomedical researchers appear
to avoid the “E-word” when describing antibiotic resistance (Antonovics et al., 2007). Similarly, while school curricula typically include discussion of within-species change, they
rarely address macroevolutionary processes or speciation in the biology classroom (Catley
2006; Poling & Evans, 2004a). One exception may be an introduction to dinosaurs in elementary school; yet, while young elementary school children may be skilled at classifying
dinosaurs, this does not mean they understand their role in an evolutionary framework
(Evans, 2000; Poling & Evans, 2004b). Natural history museums, on the other hand, are the
repositories of the evidence for macroevolution (Diamond and Scotchmoor, 2006), but they
do not necessarily explain the mechanisms. More often they present evolution as a linear
concept, with single individuals from particular lineages linked across geological time (Diamond and Scotchmoor, 2006).
The finding that visitors failed to generalize their understanding of evolution across
diverse species indicates that they did not realize that evolutionary processes are a fundamental attribute of living things, at both the microscopic and the macroscopic level. Biological change in HIV, for example, is a process that can best be understood using an
evolutionary lens. The majority of the visitors, however, used intuitive reasoning to explain the changes. This suggests that public health campaigns, medical schools, and health
curricula should emphasize an evolutionary perspective when describing such health issues (Nesse & Williams, 1996). Furthermore, exhibitions and curricula that provide opportunities for generalizing across diverse species are more likely to be successful in relaying
this fundamental concept.
Finally, from the theoretical implications outlined above, there are some specific proposals for providing transitions or bridges between intuitive and evolutionary reasoning
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patterns. Essentialist intuitions should be explicitly challenged by providing multiple examples of within- and between-species diversity. Change rather than stability is part of the
natural order. Further, goal-directed concepts should be explicitly decoupled from an intentional reasoning pattern that involves mental state terminology.
Future research in informal and formal settings should focus on ways of bringing about
these transitions. One of the limitations of this study is the focus on open-ended interviews
and visitors’ explanations, which are language-based. One advantage of this procedure,
however, is that visitors’ explanations revealed their implicit understanding, rather than
the ability to merely recognize evolutionary concepts. Moreover, we were able to offer detailed quantitative as well as qualitative analyses. Finally, this focus gave us a rich database
that can be exploited to provide stems for a nuanced set of closed-ended questions that
explicitly target these core concepts (Spiegel et al., submitted).
Conclusion
These findings highlight the need to help the public understand that microevolutionary
and macroevolutionary processes occur in all living kinds. While the majority of the museum-going public might be willing to accept evolutionary origins, it appears that they are
not familiar enough with the fundamental principles of evolution to understand the mechanisms of Darwinian evolutionary change. Understanding and acceptance do not go hand
in hand, historically, or in contemporary populations, even for those exposed to Darwinian
evolutionary ideas. For the museum-going public, the normative reasoning pattern appears to be that of a synthetic blend, a fusion of evolutionary concepts and intuitive beliefs.
The model presented in this study and these results can be used to help educators, in formal and informal settings, identify the reasoning patterns of their students and visitors
and the factors that elicit these different reasoning patterns. A single museum visit, or even
several, are unlikely to effect radical conceptual change. Yet, incremental shifts toward
more informed naturalistic reasoning could potentially usher in a cascade of more dramatic changes.
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